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PREFACE
Tuesday, December 23, 1980, presented as a crisp, clear day with ample sunshine.
Two young Emergency Medical Technicians sat in a temporary medical facility on a
major construction site in southern Kentucky. At approximately 9:20 AM a frantic voice
echoed across the portable radio stating, “Man down at the power plant.” As the
technicians hurriedly grabbed for trauma kits and hardhats, a follow-up question came
through: How bad? The one-word response caused a collective pause: fatal.
A 63-year-old worker, along with his great nephew and another younger worker,
had traveled to the site to install specially fabricated colored metal panels around the
upper portion of the power plant building. The leader stood on a swinging scaffold 40
feet above the ground; the others would hand the roughly four foot square panels over the
edge of the roof and help place them to be fastened.
Based on reports from witnesses, a gust of wind caused the elder worker to lose
his balance and fall backwards from the scaffold to the ground. Despite a timely response
and rapid transport, the individual expired at approximately 10:25 AM. The trio of
workers had planned to leave the site at 10:30 AM to return home to Mississippi for the
Christmas holiday.
At the time of the accident, the worker wore a fall prevention belt but did not have
the end secured to the building or scaffold. While the medical personnel attended to the
worker, the site safety director looked on and made a statement that ultimately changed
the life and world view of at least one of those present: “I saw him not tied off yesterday;
I guess I should have said something.”
At the time of this incident, the site safety director held the sole responsibility for
enforcing safety rules among contractors. He had placed himself in the key leadership
vi

role for safety. Had he chosen to address the issue the previous day, the incident might
well have not happened. Had a culture of compliance existed, the expectation may well
have led to a safer mindset among the affected worker and others across the project.
Out of this example of poor safety leadership emerged at least one advocate who
remains true to a self-commitment made that morning, to never fail to confront such
issues when observed. It is my hope that this research and dissertation helps to further
those efforts.
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The purpose of this study was to explore the correlation between employee
perceptions of their supervisor’s commitment to safety (safety climate) and the actual rate
of occupational injuries among the same employees. The study also aimed to examine the
relationship between the employee perceptions of their supervisor’s leadership practices
and the supervisor’s safety climate rating. In addition, this study examined the potential
influence of employee demographic factors on their responses to survey questions.
This research study sought to answer three primary questions: (1) Does a
significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of his supervisor’s
commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual injury/illness rates within an
organization? (2) Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership
practices of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?
(3) Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and leadership
practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic variables including gender,
education level, skilled versus non-skilled positions, time in position, or shift assignment?
Previous studies of similar construct focused on industrial settings such as
manufacturing, construction, and oil and gas exploration. This study focused on workers
engaged in maintenance type functions within the non-industrial setting of a university.
The construct and findings of this study has applicability in a variety of settings including
healthcare, general business, etc. Developing an understanding of the role that
xii

supervisors play in actively driving safety programs that affect their subordinates
provides valuable insight into elements of supervisor selection and training.
A survey instrument was developed utilizing a combination of previously
validated “safety climate” questions, along with selected general leadership questions. A
7- point Likert scale was employed for the safety climate and leadership practices
questions. Demographic questions were included to provide critical data for application
for research question three. In addition, three questions were included to solicit data
regarding each respondent’s injury experience for the previous 12 month period.
The findings of this study, while in several instances not yielding statistically
significant data, support several key assertions that appear to have relevancy in the study
and practice of the critical importance of leadership in providing a safe workplace. A
strong correlation emerged between participant responses to safety climate and general
leadership actions questions, demonstrating the interrelationship of leadership to safety.
In addition, the findings indicated that demographic factors including gender, education
level, length of service, and assigned work shift had negligible effect on employee views
of their leaders.
The results of this study provide useful information regarding the influence of
supervisor’s actions upon the safety performance of their employees. In addition, the
study helps validate the relationship of general leadership practices of supervisors to the
overall safety climate of their work groups. While additional research into the concept
and practical application of safety climate as a predictor of safety performance should be
undertaken, the findings of this study add to collective knowledge of the subject.
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CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION
In 2011, 4600 active workers in the United States died as a result of occupational
injuries and illnesses. Another 1.18 million received injuries that resulted in their absence
from work at least one day, with the average number of days lost per individual being
eight (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). These statistics do not represent an anomaly;
conversely, the numbers represent an average year in the world of work in the U.S.
In strictly business terms, the National Safety Council estimated that on average,
an occupational fatality occurring in the U.S. results in an economic loss of $1.39 million.
Non-fatal serious occupational injuries resulted in an average cost of $54,000. By
applying these estimates, one can view the potential financial impact of occupational
fatalities alone in 2011 approached $6.394 billion, while serious non-fatal injuries
accounted for $63.72 billion (National Safety Council, 2012). The estimated impact of
these events in monetary terms, while substantial by most reasonable standards, remains
little more than a fleeting thought to most business and public service leaders, until of
course an incident strikes one of their employees or affects a friend or family member.
Background
Many accidents result either directly or indirectly from the carelessness of
employees. An injury can directly occur when an employee purposely bypasses a
machine guard and is injured by a moving component. Employees also incur injuries
from indirect actions such as one employee removing and failing to replace a guard,
resulting in a second employee contacting a hazard.
Developing concrete methods for controlling the human element in relation to
occupational injuries remains somewhat an enigma. No clear consensus exists regarding
where the lines of demarcation for ownership of safety should lie between the employer
1

and the worker. Most leaders of U.S. organized labor and many government officials
have long taken the position that the employers assume the total burden for the safety of
workers, and individual workers should assume no fault or responsibility for their actions
relative to their own safety or the safety of their coworkers (Hammer, 1981).
The regulatory view relative to responsibility for safety in U.S. organizations,
under the purview of the federal or state Occupational Safety and Health programs,
resides in the Code of Federal Register 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Act: SEC.
5. Duties:
(a) Each employer -(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees;
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated
under this Act.
29 USC 654
(b) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this Act which are
applicable to his own actions and conduct. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1970)
Although management under the law has the ultimate responsibility for providing
a safe and healthy workplace, the employee also has a duty to “comply” with all
applicable safety rules and standards (U.S. Department of Labor, 1970). This divergent
perspective regarding accountability for safety, particularly in unionized workplaces,
many times results in a stalemate of sorts where real issues and hazards exist unchecked
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whether mechanical, physical, or human, resulting in lingering hazards and repeated
occurrences of injuries.
While an argument exists for both sides of this issue, a more relevant question
surfaces amid the fray: How do some heavily unionized companies maintain world-class
levels of safety performance? The answer may reside in examples such as Alcoa
Corporation, E.I. DuPont, and General Motors Company L.L.C.
Krause (2001) discussed the influence of Paul O’Neill, who became CEO of
Alcoa in 1987. He would later become Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.
When O’Neill took over the company, he faced many challenges ranging from labor
issues to low shareholder returns on investments.
Krause (2001) contended that O’Neill turned around Alcoa by establishing a
climate where employees were viewed as the strength of the company. Safety and
accident prevention become a top priority across the entire company. Alcoa distinguished
itself from other companies by setting a visible goal of “zero” injuries. More important,
O’Neill held his executives personally accountable for the accidents that occurred in their
respective facilities. Ultimately, the accountability factor applied to the welfare of
employees brought the United Steel Workers Union to the party as a true joint partner in
the company safety efforts.
O’Neill brought a similar influence to General Motors when he assumed a
position on the board of directors in 1983. Near the end of his first meeting, O’Neill
asked a key question: “Where’s the safety report?” This seemingly simple question
proved to be a pivotal moment because the implications appeared obvious to top leaders.
They honestly did not know the status of employee safety within their own company.
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The actions that the Chairman, CEO, and President of GM took in response
turned a tense moment of uncertainty into a path to leadership that included a lasting
partnership with the United Auto Workers and a position as the leader in safety
performance of all automotive companies both U.S. and foreign (Simon & Frazee, 2005).
The E. I. DuPont Corporation stands as another example of strong organizational
leadership of safety. Former President Thomas Jefferson encouraged E.I. DuPont to
establish a gunpowder manufacturing operation in the United States. DuPont apprenticed
under the Chief of the Royal Powder Works in France before moving to America (Klein,
2009).
DuPont established his powder works in Delaware in 1803, and from the
beginning established a unique approach to safety that remains a cornerstone of
operations for DuPont Corporation today. DuPont understood from experience the
inherent dangers involved in making, storing, and shipping gunpowder. He recognized
that the responsibility for safety had to reside with every person in the organization from
the newest employee to himself as the owner (Klein, 2009).
To support his interest in displaying the importance of safety, DuPont took a very
unique approach in building his family home in the center of the powder works. This
move served to enhance his responsiveness and oversight of the operation and also to
serve as a sign to his workers that by and large the plant was a safe place to work and also
to live. These two examples provide evidence that positive leadership actions focused on
the safety of employees can affect significant, lasting change in the largest of
organizations, even with the added complexity of a union environment as in the cases of
Alcoa and General Motors (Klein, 2009).
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In order to better protect their workers from the risks they face every day,
organizational leaders must understand the critical importance of establishing a strong
institutional focus on safety. The power to foster a positive organizational safety culture
and climate resides not with the safety professional; the responsibility lands squarely on
the shoulders of the management team from the top down to the first line supervisor.
Establishing a positive safety climate most assuredly helps nurture an environment where
people value the opportunity to recognize potential hazards and work together to
collectively identify means and methods to accomplish the tasks at hand with the least
amount of risk possible.
Understanding the Problem
The realization that, on average, 12 workers in the U.S. leave home each day and
do not return as a result of occupational fatalities causes reflection on the part of many,
particularly those individuals tasked with implementing programs and policies focused on
protecting workers. Leaders must begin to understand how so many workers sustain
injuries in a country with copious safety and labor laws along with cutting edge safety
technologies (U.S. Department of Labor, 2013). Exploring the causal factors involved in
the majority of occupational fatalities lends one to conclude that the answer resides not in
the laws or machinery, but within the workers, managers, and ultimately senior leaders
themselves.
Machine guards and safety hazard warning signs do not prevent a worker from
injury if they remove or otherwise bypass a machine guard or ignore posted warnings. A
comprehensive safety system must strive for higher level safeguard that constantly
separates workers from potential hazards, regardless of human actions or inactions.
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Deming (1986) contended that management directly controls 94 % of all quality
problems within a typical organization. Deming further insisted that quality defects
within a production system can be prevented if management assumes responsibility and
then unites, trains, and empowers all employees toward a “constancy of purpose” focused
on “continuous improvement.” Deming’s 14 Obligations of Management readily apply
to the area of safety, specifically to the concept of an integrated safety system. Salazar
(2006) relate the similarities present between quality and safety within an organization.
Management must assume responsibility for preventing injuries within their respective
“span of control.” Leveraging sound leadership practices, organizational leaders must
involve their subordinates utilizing a combination of training and active engagement.
Modern safety management theories, including “Behavior Based Safety,” focus
on the need to engage the employees and leaders and continually redirect their attention
to safety. Many organizations attempt to drive safe behaviors through extensive training,
worker team empowerment, or employee safety incentive programs, all of which have
found their place in the quest for safer workplaces. Individually these initiatives will have
some positive effect on the safety of a workplace, but in most cases the impact of any one
alone proves relatively short lived, and ultimately the organization’s injury rate
improvements reach a plateau or increase. To sustain a positive behavior-based safety
program, leaders must engage personnel at all levels of the organization to consistently
practice safety (Geller, 2001).
Ansari and Modarress (1997) provided examples of several major American
corporations that have demonstrated sustained safety improvement. The companies
included: DuPont, Allied Signal, Proctor and Gamble, 3M, General Electric, IBM,
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Boeing, and Kaiser Aluminum. They further identified executive leadership as a primary
driver of successful safety programs: “...most business executives now share the
realization that the foremost factor in becoming a world-class safety performer is strong
commitment and meaningful leadership by top management. Creating world-class safety
performance requires unquestioned commitment by the executive leadership towards
safety” (p. 391).
The key difference between these successful entities and others with less
successful safety programs resides in their leadership structure and programs. These
organizations have a fundamental understanding that no program will work consistently
without positive leadership at all levels. While top executive support for safety is critical
to set the tone for the organization, all leaders down to the first-line supervisor be
committed to safety and demonstrate this commitment on a continual basis (Ansari &
Modarress, 1997).
The premise that the first-line supervisor holds a critical importance as the
primary interface with workers serves as the basis for the construct of this research. In
essence the perceptions held by the average worker toward a supervisor with regard to the
supervisor’s safety leadership acumen and actions may serve as the best barometer of the
overall environment of safety within the organization as a whole. It stands to reason that
the supervisor must demonstrate a clear commitment to worker safety through
communication and other actions to positively influence worker perceptions (Krause,
2008).
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Worker Safety in Non-Industrial Environments
The preponderance of safety regulations along with safety related research and
literature focus on safety in manufacturing and other industrial environments, due
primarily to the fact that these settings contain more workers engaged in activities that
involve hazardous equipment or processes. This higher level of potential risk and
exposure of workers to hazards has historically produced higher injury rates among these
workers.
While settings such as educational institutions, healthcare facilities, and other
non-industrial settings may not garner the same level of attention regarding injury
potential, within the operations of these entities employees engage in regular work
activities including facilities maintenance, housekeeping, construction, lawn and grounds
maintenance, etc. The workers assigned to these activities, though smaller in overall
numbers when compared to those in industrial settings, face similar hazards based upon
the tasks assigned. A concern resides in the potential for leaders at universities and other
non-industrial entities to underestimate the risks that workers in their maintenance and
support functions face, due to an overall perception that general conditions within their
operations pose limited risk.
Theoretical Framework
This study will focus on the validity of safety climate measures as a predictor of
injury frequency within a given organization. While this work will utilize a similar
construct to previous endeavors, it will be seminal with regard to the focus on a nonindustrial setting.
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Chapter II will provide insights into the impact of organizational culture and
climate safety in general terms, with a focus on the more specific sub-set of safety
climate, relative to the overall safety performance of an organization. The body of prior
related research will provide the foundation, framework, and rationale for the
development of the overall research construct.
Research Questions
The proposed research will attempt to determine if a correlation exists between an
employee’s perceptions of the supervisor’s commitment to the safety of workers in their
charge and the actual occurrence of injuries within the surveyed group.
The research design consists of a paper survey that will be distributed and
collected during regularly scheduled employee staff meetings. A member of the
Environmental Health and Safety staff will hand out the survey.
Three primary research questions form the foundation of this research:
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of his
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual
injury/illness rates within an organization?
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices
of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their
employees?
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?
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Rationale and Significance of This Study
While research exists related to both supervisors’ leadership actions and safety
climate and the respective effects on organizational safety, the focus to date has included
primarily manufacturing, construction, heavy industry, and oil and gas exploration. At the
time of this writing no studies emerged that explored the concept of safety climate or the
application of safety climate measures in a non-industrial setting.
This study will contribute to the existing body of research related to safety climate
in general and, more specifically, the applicability of safety climate measures as an
indicator of organizational safety performance in the form of occupational injuries and
illnesses. The inclusion of an assessment of employee observations of general leadership
actions will provide a substantive cross-reference to the potential impact of leadership on
safety climate within the groups surveyed.
Nature of Study
The survey tool used in this study includes general demographic questions related
to length of employment, assigned shift, gender, education level, job type, and experience
level of the participant’s supervisor. Nine questions related to safety climate make up the
core of the instrument. These questions have emerged from a variety of studies based on
a seminal research project, as detailed in Zohar (1980). Eleven questions related to
general leadership observations were added to the instrument to bolster the overall
validity of the findings.
Finally, three specific questions related to the injury history of the participants
were included to solicit data aimed at drawing a comparison of the individual participants
assessment of supervisor focus on safety, or safety climate, with their personal history of
injuries within the preceding 12 months.
10

Limitations of Study
The study will focus on one staff department at a single regional comprehensive
university. The subject department performs a variety of functions including general
maintenance, housekeeping, and grounds maintenance. The selection of a staff
department opposed to an academic functional area will make the findings of the study
more applicable to other non-manufacturing settings with similar staff support functions.
The findings of the study have limits due to a potential lack of geographic, cultural,
ethnic, and/or gender diversity that may exist within the organization sampled.
Definitions
Occupational safety and related areas tend to use a variety of specific
terminology. The following section includes definitions in an effort to provide clarity of
meaning of selected terms as utilized in this work:
Behavior Based Safety - concept of safety management that focuses on the actions
of people and methods to modify the behaviors that are deemed to result in employee
injuries or that allow unsafe-conditions to exist within an organization (Geller, 2001).
Disabling Injury - injury that results in an employee being unable to perform the
normal job functions resulting in modified job assignments and/or lost work days
(Industrial Accident Prevention Association, 2007).
OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration is a division of the U.S.
Department of Labor that was established with the passage of the Williams-Steiger Act in
1970. The legislation, also known as the OSH Act, established a greater regulatory role
for the federal and state governments in assuring that employers provided a workplace
free of recognized hazards (Walter, 2011).
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Occupational Fatality - death of a worker that occurs while performing normal
job functions or arises out of exposure to a hazard that occurs while engaged in normal
work activities (U.S. Department of Labor, 2001).
Occupational Injury or Illness - injury or occupational related illness that occurs
while performing normal job functions or arises out of exposure to a hazard that occurs
while engaged in normal work activities (U.S. Department of Labor, 2001).
Organizational Safety Culture - “The product of the individual and group values,
attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and
the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programs” (Mansdorf,
1999 p. 1).
Safety Climate - Zohar (1980) provided a view of safety climate as “…a
summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environments” (p.
96).
Summary
Many leaders struggle with how to improve the safety of their organizations and
better protect their employees. While many programs and practices for safety
management exist, their overall effectiveness remains bound to the ability of the
organization’s leadership team to effectively implement and maintain a level of
continuous improvement. Leaders must accurately assess and interpret the state of safety
within their organizations. Providing leaders with effective tools to help unravel the
layers of complexity associated with organizational dynamics, particularly in a specific
area such as employee safety, is essential to furthering efforts at injury prevention.
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Utilizing survey instruments to assess safety climate has been proven to serve as a
valid predictive indicator of employees’ perceptions of an organization’s overall focus on
safety (Zohar, 1980). Research in this subject area to date has remained focused
primarily on manufacturing and other industrial settings. Expanding the body of existing
safety climate research into additional categories of organizations can provide valuable
supportive data regarding the versatility of such measures as an indicator of effective
safety leadership.
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CHAPTER II : REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter will provide supportive data relative to the topic of safety climate as
a predictive indicator of the potential for occupational injuries in a given workgroup.
Safety climate, as defined in the seminal work of Zohar (1980), focuses on the
perceptions of employees in a workgroup regarding their supervisors’ focus on their
safety.
Simard and Marchand (1995) provided insight into the concept that workers
perceptions of the relative safety within their workgroups is influenced by a variety of
multilevel factors, including the actions and reactions of their first-line supervisor, along
with the perceived commitment of senior leadership toward safety. Their findings
indicated a direct correlation between the level of effectiveness of the supervisor and
senior leaders in promoting a work environment focused on safety of workers within their
workgroups and the level of satisfaction the workers felt toward their safety. Griffin and
Neal (2000) reported similar findings in a study of Australian manufacturing and mining
facilities, noting that safety resides as a “higher order factor” (p. 347) that affects the
overall worker perception of the work environment. In addition, the study noted a strong
relationship between safety climate and worker compliance with safety rules and
participation in safety related activities across the organizations studied.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this literature review centers on first exploring the
history of occupational safety from the late 1800s to the present in order to provide a
panoramic view of events that have helped shape worker safety in the present day.
Second, the review chronicles the general concepts and selected research regarding the
14

topics of organizational culture and climate in general. The third segment of the review
will delve into the more specific and primary focus area of safety climate and provide
insight into its construct, measurement, and practical implications for organizations.
The 1980 study by Zohar serves as the starting point for research related to the
assessment of safety climate and for utilizing the resulting data as a predictive indicator
of occupational injury proclivity within specific organizations. While the selected studies
differ somewhat in setting, survey instrument, or approach, they share a common thread,
in that they focus on the concept that organizational leaders have the greatest potential to
influence the safety climate of an organization.
The Evolution of Safety in the U.S. – Lessons in Leadership
When the Railway Safety Act was being considered in 1893, a railroad
executive said that it would cost less to bury a man killed in an accident than to
put air brakes on a car. This railroad executive probably was not a malicious man.
In all probability he believed in God, was a good husband and loving father, and
patted his dog when he came home. He would have done anything to avoid injury
to his family or dog, but the safety of other individuals was considered only in
monetary terms. (Hammer, 1981, p.1)
Such a statement today would most likely bring rapid and staunch rebuke; however, at
the time the statement received little attention based on the norms of business.
While broad-based standardized governmental records of occupational injuries
did not commence in the U.S. until 1970, some examples exist of injury data focused on
specific industries, such as mining and railroads, as early as the 1800s. References to
comparative data regarding fatalities between similar industries in the U.S. and countries
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such as Great Britain appear as early as 1890, as noted by Aldrich (2010). In the period of
1890-1905, American mines had fatality rates between 2.52 and 3.53 per thousand
workers, depending on the type of coal being mined. The reports further indicate that,
during the same period, British mines posted fatality rates between 1.28 and 1.61 per
thousand employees.
An interesting point exists, in that the U.S. fatality rates increased from 2.52 in the
period of 1890-1894 to 3.53 during 1900-1905, while the British rates decreased from
1.61 to 1.28 per thousand during the same periods. One would ask, Why the variance
between the U.S. and Great Britain? Fundamental differences existed in the nature of
mining in the U.S. and Great Britain during this period; chiefly coal in Great Britain
resided much deeper in the earth than most U.S. coal. This logistical fact resulted in the
British mines being more costly and difficult to establish; these issues led the British
mining companies to invest more in mine structures and to conduct mining operations in
a more patient manner in order to extract the most coal from each mine. This combination
of monetary investment and slower timeline resulted in a safer working environment
(Aldrich, 2010).
Conversely, the typical U.S. veins of coal formed much closer to the surface and
existed in many different areas of the country. These facts led many U.S. mining
companies to operate in a much less methodical manner, using less expensive methods to
shore the mine walls and roofs and more explosives to extract the most coal in the
shortest time period. These conditions and methods, coupled with practices such as pay
based on the amount of coal extracted versus an hourly rate, made the U.S. operations
substantially less safe than those in Britain (Aldrich, 2010).
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Aldrich (2010) noted similar disparity in fatality rates between British and U.S.
railroad workers during the same time period. Rates among U.S. railroaders were almost
twice those of their British counterparts. The greatest influencing factor that accounted
for the higher rates on the U.S. railroad related to the investment in installing safety
equipment such as automatic couplers and air braking systems. In short, the British
simply put more money toward safer trains and safer work practices than did their
counterparts at U.S. railroads.
Many other examples throughout the 20th century reflect apparent callousness
toward the welfare of workers by business leaders. These actions appear as a primary
factor leading to the rise of the labor movement in the United States. Reynolds (1989)
discussed the impact of the election of Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency in 1932. The
country remained in the Great Depression. Roosevelt negotiated the passage of The
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which eased many restrictions on corporations
regarding anti-trust issues such as setting standard wages and prices in a collaborative
manner.
Citing concerns of safety in the workplaces along with other poor working
conditions, the Act also included a trade-off for labor leaders in sections 7A that
guaranteed workers the right to form unions with leaders of their choosing. The initial
reactions from leaders, such as Alford Sloan at General Motors, included the
establishment of internal employee committees to review issues such as working
conditions. Sloan and other industrial leaders did not attempt to disguise the purpose of
these committees. They maintained focus on the need to address employee concerns and
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ultimately deny the union’s key issues on which to rally workers and establish a power
base.
The committees succeeded with regard to general working conditions. However,
the financial issues proved too much and ultimately led to a rise in membership across
most unions, including the United Auto Workers. While the safety of workers remained a
structural component of the overreaching topic of working conditions, ironically, safety
did not appear as a primary bargaining issue in the early days of modern U.S. unionism.
Following contentious and lengthy strikes against General Motors in the late
1930s, the UAW established a wide-reaching agreement that secured its place as the sole
employee representative body for almost all GM facilities. Safety emerged as a pivotal
issue in later agreements. It became one of a sacred few issues for which the union could
call a strike. These actions elevated worker safety by making it a critical trump card for
the union as leverage for all manner of negotiations (Reynolds, 1989).
Evidence of understanding of the impact of occupational injuries and illnesses
appeared in descriptions by Tolman and Kendall (1913):
It is the general opinion of the engineering profession that one-half the accidents
in the United States are preventable, and that a conservative estimate of the annual
number of accidents which result fatally or in partial or total incapacity on the part
of the worker may be placed at 500,000. (p. 2)
Early prevention efforts by companies included widespread use of personal
protective equipment such as footwear, safety glasses, and outer garments, all barriers
aimed to shield workers from physical hazards in the environment. Companies also
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began to explore methods of protecting workers from moving machinery and equipment
through machine guards and physical barriers (Rittenberry, 2007).
A distinct evolution of safety theory and practice appeared with the passage of
early workers’ compensation laws and a transformation of the legal system; companies
assumed more accountability for financial support of injured workers. As a result of the
increased economic impact, companies began to explore ways to improve worker safety,
primarily based on financial reasons. Additional influences included the creation of
organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in 1896 and the
National Safety Council (NSC) in 1913. These non-profit organizations brought together
key groups, including academics and business leaders to develop standards and
operational guidelines and best practices to make workplaces safer (Aldrich, 2010).
The U.S. Department of Labor, established in 1913, began to look at a variety of
issues related to U.S. workplaces. Their primary focus for most of the 20th century
included wages, working hours, child labor, workers compensation, etc. The passage of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1971 served as a milestone, putting forth
national standards for safety in the workplace (Board on Health Sciences Policy, 2013).
Most significant regulatory efforts came as a result of major incidents that drew
attention to unsafe conditions or practices. No incident proved more pivotal than the
Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of 1911. The factory location in New York City made the
Saturday afternoon incident a spectacle for the public and news media alike. In addition,
the majority of the victims were young women, portrayed as helpless pawns in the
various news accounts. This fact alone helped fuel public outrage. Another element
involved the number of victims that jumped to their death from the ninth and tenth floors
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of the factory. When graphic photos of victims in the air or on the sidewalks where they
landed appeared in major newspapers and magazines, a morbid anger arose followed
closely by calls for new laws and regulations (Cornell University, 2011).
The investigation found numerous fire and life safety issues, some considered
violations of existing fire codes, others that codes had not yet been established to cover.
In the aftermath of the Triangle fire, the city, State of New York, and even national
standards-making organizations such as NFPA enacted code revisions to address fire
escapes, fire doors, stairwell enclosures, and building fire sprinklers among others.
Ultimately, the high loss of life in the Triangle Fire could have been mitigated if the
supervisors/managers of the operations had not locked the fire exits and reconfigured the
exits left open to allow only one person at a time to move through them. The managers
took each of these actions to assure that no worker left the work area without permission
and that workers could be closely scrutinized as they exited to prevent theft of cloth or
clothing (Cornell University, 2011).
Key Factors Affecting U.S. Safety Performance
Many individuals, groups, movements, innovations, and significant historical
events receive credit for improving the overall safety of workers today. The more notable
groups include the onset of formal collective bargaining of unions, the establishment of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and innovations in safe design of
machinery and equipment (Manuele, 1997).
Reynolds (1989) documented several key factors related to the various unions’
influence on health and safety, beginning in the 1930s. Union leaders such as Walter
Ruether, head of the United Auto Workers, made very aggressive stands against Ford and
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General Motors. Both companies fought the concept of union organization, viewing
unions as an outside influence that would disrupt their operations and negatively impact
their companies, and leveraged their political capital to enlist police and even the
National Guard to fight the union organizers.
West (1986) provided examples of the primary factors that combined to help drive
the successful organization of General Motors Workers in Flint, Michigan, and led to a
pivotal point in modern union history, the sit-down strike of 1936-37. There appeared
several issues that topped the workers’ lists of grievances including wages, production
rates, work rules, general working conditions, and worker safety. While some politicians
appeared sympathetic to the concept of unions, they could not support the efforts of the
unions based upon wage issues alone because the workers at Ford and General Motors
were paid better than those at most other companies. Safety and working conditions
became the cornerstone of union organizers and the primary source of leverage in the
form of a basis for the threat of strikes. The threat of work stoppage based on working
conditions in turn forced companies to negotiate on all fronts including wages.
Miller (1984) provided insight into the continued influence of unions on safety,
particularly their focus on supporting the efforts of OSHA and other governmental
entities in developing new technology approaches to worker protections. The perception
that unions push employers to provide improved safety for their members remains a
critical tool for both organizing additional union members and for maintaining support
for unions with politicians that see union members as a key group of voters.
OSHA itself stands as one of the greatest influences on U.S. worker safety, as
reported by Bartel and Thomas (1985). The study focused on direct and indirect effects
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of OSHA regulations on safety. While the findings of this particular study indicated no
direct correlation between the establishment of OSHA and reductions in injury rates
among the organizations studied, the research revealed substantial indirect impacts on the
evolution of safety systems and safety compliance. OSHA activities have resulted in
company leaders and workers gaining increased knowledge of potential hazards and
related options for controlling them. This indirect effect has impacted the overall severity
of injuries and a company’s ability to proactively identify the most serious threats to
workers prior to occurrence. Ultimately, the term OSHA has become synonymous with
worker safety and safety compliance. These influencing factors have combined to
improve the overall safety of work environments and have helped facilitate a steady
decrease in occupational fatalities and serious injuries. (U.S. Department of Labor, 2008).
Another key factor that has greatly influenced safety in the workplace resides in
the advancement of technologies related to safe design of equipment and processes. Prior
to the application of a variety of engineering control principles aimed at safeguarding the
worker and improving productivity, machines were built to perform the tasks intended
and the safety of the worker addressed after installation through manual machine
guarding and personal protective equipment. The application of hazard control
technologies such as automatic equipment shutdown devices triggered when a worker
enters a potential danger zone of a piece of equipment, make the manufacture of the
equipment more cost effective, while also improving worker safety (Manuele, 1997).
The roles of unions, OSHA, and innovative technologies on workplace safety
have been substantial. A very strong inner-relationship exists between each of the three
factors. Unions played a major role in the establishment of OSHA and continue to have a
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great influence on safety standards development and enforcement strategies within the
agency. The need to find a balance between compliance with OSHA standards and the
ability to operate industrial machinery and equipment in a cost effective manner have
driven the evolution of advanced safety related technologies (Fadier & Garza, 2006).
Organizational Culture
Argyris (1955) first documented the concept that an organization consists as an
“aggregate of parts” that come together to form the “organized whole” (p. 2). In basic
terms, the people within the organization, both leaders and employees alike, bring their
collective personalities, life experiences, and worldviews with them every day.
Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey (2013) provided a general description of
organization culture as: “shared basic assumptions, values and beliefs” (p. 362). They
further noted that these elements of culture “characterize the setting” and are perpetuated
to new members of the organization through communication of “myths and stories” (p.
362).
Rousseau (1990) provided a view of culture as a process within the organization
where individuals share their respective values, beliefs, and norms. Some members
readily share their perspectives, while others quietly process the inputs of the day. Each
individual way, whether covert or overt, adds input to the collective culture through
words and actions. While leaders may have a greater level of influence due to their
positions, one should not discount the power of the lowest level member of the
organization to influence the overall culture. Organizations by nature have unique
complexities derived from the vast divergence of individual personalities, styles, and
traits. These elements merge into a dynamic structure that forms the culture of the
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organization. The shaping of this structure through leadership practices determines the
ultimate culture of a given organization.
Schneider, Brief, and Guzzo (1996) provided several critical observations
concerning organizational culture. Their works focused on the concept that the collective
beliefs and values of the members of an organization yield the ultimate culture of that
organization.
They further surmised that organizational culture results from “firmly implanted beliefs
and values” (p. 5) within the members of a group.
Marcoulides and Heck (1993) developed a research model that defined six core
elements within the overall construct of organizational culture. These elements include
organizational structure, organizational values, task organization, organizational climate,
employee attitudes, and organizational performance. Understanding the components that
form the overall culture of an organization provides an opportunity for researchers to
dissect the larger construct into separate structural elements. This micro view aids in
understanding the implications of culture on specific operational areas of a specific
organization.
Organizational Climate
Litwin and Stringer (1968) described organizational climate as measureable
properties within the working environment that appear as indirect and direct paths to the
members of the organization and influence individual behaviors. The authors further
contended that organizational climate results from the sum of individual perceptions of
those working in an organization. Schneider, Ehrhart, and Macey (2013) concluded that
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organizational climate relates directly to employees and their perceptions of the work
environment.
Organizational climate results from individual beliefs and stems from employees’
interpretations of the assumptions, philosophies and values that comprise the cultural
norms within an organization (Brown & Brooks, 2002). Sowpow (2006) proposed that
organizational climate arises from organizational culture and can provide insight into the
current state of the organization. Organizational climate relates to the environment that
affects the behavior of the employees. It deals with the way(s) employees make sense out
of their environment (Reichers & Schneider, 1990).
Taking a more micro view of organizational culture and climate focused
specifically on the area of employee safety provides the basis for this study. In order to
affect change within an organization, one must understand the present-day dynamics that
reside within the group. Exploring the specific concept of safety climate requires a
foundation provided through a review of prior research. Understanding the elements of
safety climate and the opportunities to quantify and document it for a specific
organization will provide a roadmap for this research.
The Concept of Safety Climate
Zohar (1980) first detailed the concept of organizational climate specifically
focused on employee safety. His study focused on a number of manufacturing facilities in
Israel, and he found a positive relationship between facilities having robust safety
programs and lower incidents of accidents. From this seminal work, the specific term
“safety climate” found a lasting place in the lexicon of academic studies regarding
leadership of safety in organizations. Zohar further surmised that an organization’s
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leaders’ commitment to the safety of the employees in their charge “is a major factor
affecting the success of safety programs in industry” (p. 10).
Further references to safety culture and climate provide evidence of the
importance of a leader’s actions relative to making safety a priority within the
organization. The fundamental premise relates to the specific organizational emphasis
that exists regarding the expectations for employees to perform tasks in a safe manner.
These expectations play a critical part in how employees view the safety climate of their
workplace (Zohar, 2000).
Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) noted that safety climate has a direct correlation to
safe or unsafe behaviors in employees. Krause (2008) concluded that management at its
basic level includes motivation, coordination, and providing direction to employees to
accomplish established objectives. How supervisors interject safety into these
management elements has a direct effect on the safety climate of the organization.
Safety climate involves a collective of factors. These include management values,
organizational practices, organizational communications, and employee engagement in
safety (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000). Leaders need to understand that each of these factors
must exist in a positive way to support a perception of safety in the view of the employee
in order to establish and maintain a positive safety climate.
The key to the application of safety climate as a tool for leaders resides in their
ability to measure the safety climate within an organization and then utilize the data to
develop a useful snapshot of the organization. At least five studies have purported a
predictive application between safety climate and future safety performance within an
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organization (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Gillen, Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002;
Hoffman & Mark 2006; Hofman & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000).
The Relationship between Leadership and Safety Climate
Ultimately, the positives of good leadership and the negatives of poor leadership
have received ample attention in the literature. Great leaders have resurrected
downtrodden businesses and countries; and at times, one can argue the world itself, in the
case of World War II. Most of the great leadership moments in history emerged from the
poor leadership that preceded them.
Kozlowksi and Doherty (1989) noted that early theorists (Blake & Mouton, 1964;
Indik, 1968; Lewin, 1951; Likert, 1967; Litwin & Stringer, 1968; McGregor, 1960)
regarded leadership as an important organizational factor that affected employees’
perceptions of climate. Momeni (2009) concluded that a leader’s behavior has a great
influence on employee attitudes, behaviors, emotions, morale, and perceptions. Thus, an
examination of the literature suggests that a leader’s behavior can potentially result in the
creation and continual survival of a positive, thriving organizational climate in a nonprofit organization.
Leaders define the key operating principles of their organizations, including not
only the formal business practices, policies, and procedures, but also the informal
operating culture and climate of their organizations. The climate elements that influence
their organization’s functions also serve as the key factors that dictate the quality of the
working environment. In order to shape an organization in a positive manner, leaders
must understand the primary elements of organizational culture. Sorting through this data
can prove somewhat problematic due to the existence of many plausible theories related
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to the subject developed from extensive academic research over several decades (Zohar
& Luria, 2005).
In many cases the ability of a strong leader to establish a set of positive
organizational values and operating norms provides a basis for the beliefs of individual
members of the organization. Examples can be seen of leaders establishing and
maintaining such cultures reflected in recognition of companies as “best employers”
coupled with positive overall business performance (Smith, 2012).
Krause (2008) discussed the potential for contribution of supervisors to the safety
performance of their respective workgroups. He discussed their role as a “natural proxy”
for senior leaders. Many supervisors do not approach safety in a positive manner because
“their role in safety is poorly understood” (p. 1). The influence of the supervisor emerged
in much earlier works, such as those of Fleishman, Harris, and Burtt (1955), who
recorded a direct correlation between subordinate views of supervisory consideration and
“the number of trips to the dispensary for treatment of injuries sustained while at work”
(p. 63).
Lewin (1951) found that leadership styles directly impacted organizational
climate. It would appear reasonable to extend the concept to safety climate as a subset of
the overall organizational climate. Similar findings emerged in research by Dunbar
(1975), where results implied that subordinates’ view of their leader’s interest in their
safety and general welfare appeared to be strongly influenced by the actions of the
supervisor.
A reasonable assumption can be made that the first-line supervisor would wield
the greatest level of influence on subordinates. The supervisor spends the greatest amount
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of time as a leader of the group and generally communicates both positive and negative
information to the employee. The leader’s actions theoretically will have the greatest
impact on the work environment of the average employee.
Understanding the concepts of leadership styles, along with an analysis of
research on the potential effects of a leader’s approach to interactions with subordinates,
provides valuable insight into the direct impact of leaders on the safety climate of the
workgroup they lead. Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) introduced the concepts of
transactional and transformational leadership tendencies. Transactional leaders tend to
lead subordinates to complete assigned tasks through a system of anticipated rewards or
recognition, while transformational leaders guide subordinates through a more persuasive
model based on positive relationships and common goals and objectives (Hater & Bass,
1988).
Zohar (2002) explored the relevance of supervisors’ leadership tendencies to the
safety climate and injury mediation capabilities of a workgroup. Transformational leaders
tend to exhibit stronger leader-follower interaction which positively influences the
perception of the leader’s concern for the wellbeing of subordinates, and in turn the
overall safety climate of the workgroup. The common attributes of a transformational
leader tend to send a stronger message regarding the importance of safety by reducing the
power-distance between supervisor and subordinates.
Zohar (2002) continued by addressing the effects of transactional leaders on the
safety climate of a workgroup. Transactional leaders tend to adopt a style of hard-and-fast
rules that subordinates must follow to maintain order within the workgroup. This style of
leadership at the group level promotes an atmosphere based on strong individual
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relationships and promotes more feelings of nameless workers, which tends to send
negative or mixed messages regarding the importance of worker safety.
Parry and Proctor-Thomson (2002) reported similar observations regarding
perceived integrity of leaders based on style or tendencies. Transformational leaders build
feelings of trust and ultimately cultivate a higher level of respect from their subordinates,
which translates to integrity as a leader.
Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) stated that subordinates see true transformational
leaders as authentic and ultimately ethical. The authors further observed that many
transactional leaders attempt to display certain behaviors related to transformational
leaders, but without the true underpinnings of leadership. A label of “pseudotransformational leadership” (p.186) is applied to this phenomenon. The authors call into
question the innate ethics of leaders engaged in the practice.
More recent works on leadership traits and styles, such as Lefton and Buzzotta
(2004), provide compelling arguments against the practice of aligning individual leaders
into restrictive categories such as transactional or transformational. The primary
contention for using broader dimensional assessment models versus more restrictive
categories resides in the concept that human behavior is both multi-dimensional and
variable-dependent based upon a variety of factors. The authors advocate categorizing the
behaviors of leaders or their leadership style based on a four-quadrant dimensional model
that includes dominant-hostile (Autocratic), submissive-hostile (Unassertive),
submissive-warm (Easygoing), or dominant-warm (Collaborative).
The case presented by Lefton and Buzzotta (2004) contended that the assessments
of leaders should focus on individual behaviors as opposed to generalized labels such as
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transformational or transactional. The premise set forth contends that, once a person
(superior, peers, or subordinate) affixes a label on a co-worker, it tends to remain.
Moreover, the tendency exists to see the behaviors or actions in a person that fit the label.
If one looks at the underling behavior(s) of individuals in specific circumstances, it
becomes easier to understand why they act or react in a certain way and, more
importantly provides the opportunity to affect positive change focused on the behaviors.
More recent works such as presented by Heifetz (2010) proposed a concept of
flexible or “adaptive” work. This approach is rooted in two primary assumptions. The
first explored the erroneous assumption that the connection between leaders and
followers is an “absolute and inherently logical structure” (p. 505). The complexion of
leader-follower interactions takes on a variety of forms with truly effective leaders
transforming one-time followers into co-leaders focused on the tasks at hand. The second
assumption addressed the variability of leadership dynamics based upon the “context of
problems and challenges” faced at a particular point and time; in short, the most effective
leaders “mobilize people to meet adaptive challenges” (p. 506).
Heifetz (2010) provided further description of the adaptive work concept, and the
overall need for adoption of the operating principle, by identifying seven key descriptive
elements or drivers that form the overall construct:
1. Many problems require solutions that reside beyond the scope of present
operating parameters of the organization. Modern approaches to problem solving
focus on gap analysis and gap closure that require flexible solutions many times
exceeding the capabilities of traditional approaches.
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2. An effective adaptive work environment must establish a focus on continuous
learning. Developing an understanding that many issues existing within an
organization are truly people problems provides an impetus for development of
people skills to address such complexities.
3. Adaptive work requires a paradigm shift from the traditional authoritarian
structure of top down responsibility to a more balanced or flat “stakeholder”
focused model. Clearly identifying and effectively engaging the true
stakeholders to address a specific problem provides an opportunity to achieve
the most effective resolution.
4. To be effective, the concept of adaptive work mandates that the people
involved consciously evaluate the components of an issue and separate the truly
important elements from those that have limited impact. Developing the ability of
individual stakeholders as well as working groups to distinguish elements of an
issue based on relevance provides an improved problem-solving environment.
5. To achieve success, adaptive work environments must maintain a balance
between efficiency of task and creativity. Particularly in a business environment,
solving problems rapidly remains a stalwart principle based in part on the old
adage “time is money.” However, too much emphasis on speed of resolution may
eliminate potentially innovative solutions that in the long run may prove more
efficient than the proverbial quick fix.
6. Leaders must embrace the reality that adaptive work environments must
operate in a different time frame than traditional focused structures. People
require time to process the increased information flow that emerges within
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adaptive work structures, and in turn must learn to react and respond in a positive
collaborative manner. The added dimensions resulting from the interaction of
stakeholders within the adaptive environment as opposed to traditional leaderfollower structure, while potentially more complex, also provide a richer
environment for innovation and problem solving.
7. Adaptive work, while relatively new as a formal organizational construct, fits
with the normal human approach to identifying and resolving problems.
Understanding first that a problem exists, then pursuing the gathering of facts and
potential resolutions, and finally implementing the selected fix is logical based on
human history and cultural norms. In addition, the presence of diversity of culture
and values within most groups results in inevitable conflicts within an adaptive
work environment. However, if managed effectively, these conflicts may yield
more robust solutions to a variety of issues.
The concept of adaptive work and corresponding progressive work environments
provides a more accurate portrayal of modern leadership challenges, in addition to
leadership behaviors that transcend more traditional views related to styles and traits
associated with leadership practice. Understanding the basis of these evolutionary
changes in leadership theory is critical to the basis of this study relative to the influence
of leaders on the safety of their subordinates. The variables presented by concepts such as
adaptive leadership open many fronts for additional research beyond the topic at hand.
Summary
Based upon the elements of leadership theory identified in the review of the
literature, the ability to establish a correlation between safety climate and actual injury
rates among employees can serve as a predictive indicator of safety performance within a
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given workgroup. Furthering this body of research in a non-manufacturing setting will
provide additional validation of the versatility and accuracy of safety climate as
indicators of safety performance.
The literature provides substantial empirical evidence of the critical role
supervisors’ play in implementing effective safety programs within their workgroups.
The supervisor sets the tone of the workgroup regarding expectations for safety. While
executive engagement and support remain a critical piece of the puzzle as well, absence
of a safety-focused primary supervisor provides a working environment with a greater
potential for occupational injuries.
The concept of safety climate emerges from the literature review as a key
influence on the perspective that employees hold toward the relative safety of their
workplace. The ability to measure safety climate and then correlate the findings to actual
safety performance can provide a valuable predictive insight into the level of safety
within a given workgroup. This study will build on the previous works mentioned by
expanding the types of entities studied to date. The previous works focused on general
manufacturing, steel processing, oil and gas exploration, and construction settings. By
focusing on the university staff setting, the data collected within this study will broad
applicability across a variety of non-manufacturing settings.
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The primary focus of this research centers on determining whether a significant
correlation exists between a supervisor’s commitment to the safety of subordinates, as
perceived by the subordinates, and the actual injury rates among those employees.
Data were collected to explore the possible relationship between leadership
tendencies of the supervisors and their safety climate ratings as recorded by their
employees, with evaluation of differentials related to demographic variables including
gender, education level, skilled verses non-skilled positions, length of service to the
university, or shift assignment.
Research Questions
Three primary research questions form the foundation of this research:
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual
injury/illness rates within an organization?
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices of
supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?
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Methodology
Primary data collection will come from employee responses to a survey consisting
of three segments. The first includes seven employee demographic questions related to
length of overall service to the organization, length of time in current job, assigned shift,
gender, education level, functional work area, and experience level of immediate
supervisor.
Segment two consists of 20 questions, including 9 related to safety climate and 11
related to general leadership practices. The safety climate questions originated from
Zohar (1980) and received refinements in Zohar and Luria (2005) and Johnson (2007).
Permission was secured from originator for the application in this research project. The
balance of the 11 questions focused on measuring leadership tendencies originated in an
employee supervisor survey developed and utilized by the Human Resources Department
of Southern Union State Community College located in Wadley, Alabama.
Data Collection
The research design consists of a paper survey distributed and collected during
regularly scheduled employee staff meetings. A member of the Environmental Health and
Safety staff delivered the blank survey instrument, accompanied by a copy of the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval form, to the participants. Upon completion,
the participants inserted the forms into a sealed box to assure confidentiality.
Sample
During June 2013 employees of the Department of Facilities Management at a
regional university were asked to complete the paper form survey instrument during
regularly scheduled monthly group meetings. The facilities management organization at
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this university had four primary functional areas of operations: maintenance, plant
operations, building services, and grounds.
Description of Variables
Independent Variables
The primary independent variables for this study included length of service at
university, length of time in job assignment, shift worked, gender, level of education
completed, assigned work group, approximate experience level of supervisor in years,
and the number and severity of work related injuries sustained by the employee within
the previous 12 months.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for this study included the supervisor’s rating for safety
climate (Questions 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24) and general leadership practices
(Questions 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, and 27) as rated by their subordinates.
Reliability and Validity
While many views exist regarding what accounts for validity in a research
instrument, the common ground focuses on the ability of the participants to clearly
understand the questions asked and interpret them in the intended context (Kimberlin &
Winterstein, 2008).
Safety Climate Questions
The questions related to safety climate have evolved and received repeated
validation over a span exceeding 30 years (Zohar, 1980; Zohar & Luria, 2005; Johnson,
2007). Zohar and Luria (2005) produced two 16-question instruments, one focused on
the organization in totality and the second focused on a more micro or workgroup level
within the organization.
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The researchers mapped the survey questions to three dimensions that appeared similar to
findings of Brown and Holmes (1986) utilizing a 10-item survey to identify the
dimensions of risk perception, management concern, and management action.
Johnson (2007) utilized the 16 questions from Zohar and Luria (2005) as the basis
for additional research regarding the predictive validity of safety climate. While the
results validated three similar dimensions as reported by Brown and Holmes (1986), the
Johnson study took a broader view and identified the dimensions in a more
straightforward manner: caring, compliance, and coaching. In addition, the study also
noted issues of cross loading within the 16-item instrument. Using exploratory factor
analysis (Varimax Rotation), Johnson (2007) suggested the elimination of five questions
(A\B\E\I, and P) that yielded a factor loading of less than 0.60, resulting in an 11-item
safety climate survey.
The results reported by Johnson (2007) substantiated the previous works of Zohar
(1980), Brown and Holmes (1986) and Zohar and Luria (2005) indicating that, while
findings point to three distinct dimensions, a strong inner correlation exists between the
constructs as demonstrated by a minimum score of 0.93 (p < 0.05). Based on this
evidence, Johnson (2007) advocated the concept of a single global factor that best defines
and provides an opportunity to measure safety climate. Based on the overall results of
these previous studies, the safety climate questionnaire is deemed valid for the purposes
of this research.
Leadership Practices Questions
The questions related to general leadership practices have received extensive
usage by the developing institution over a five-year period as a method to measure
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employee perceptions of their immediate supervisor. Prior to their inclusion in this
research instrument, the questions received extensive review for clarity of meaning and
applicability of application for this study. The questions displayed strong face validity, as
described in Litwin (1995).
Based upon the prior use but limited evidence of formal validation, the internal
consistency of the leadership practice questions was measured utilizing Cronbach’s
alpha. A standardized alpha score of 0.93 indicated very strong internal consistency
across the nine leadership questions.
Study Limitations
The study will address one functional staff department at a single regional
comprehensive university. The selection of a staff department as opposed to an academic
college helped to make the findings of the study more applicable to other nonmanufacturing settings with similar staff support functions.
The findings may have limits due to a potential lack of geographic, cultural,
ethnic, and/or gender diversity that may exist within the organization sampled.
Summary
The norms of leadership relative to the safety of subordinates have evolved in the
United States and around the world in developed countries over the last century. This
study will help clarify the critical importance of the first-line supervisor actively leading
safety initiatives as an essential element of efforts in reducing injuries in the workplace.
The ability to measure a supervisor’s actual performance relative to demonstrated
practices in leading safety, as viewed by subordinates, provides the most promise for
establishing a correlation between the actions of a supervisor and actual injuries among
subordinates.
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The statistical results of this study, along with narrative, are found in Chapter IV.
The potential implications and application of the findings appear in Chapter V.
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Chapter IV: RESULTS
Introduction
This study focuses on determining whether a correlative relationship exists
between the employee’s perception of supervisors commitment to safety (safety climate)
within an organization and the rate of occurrence of occupational injuries among the
members of the organization. A secondary aim of the study includes an evaluation of the
relationship between the safety climate of the organization and the employees’ view of
their supervisors’ general leadership practices. The final purpose of the study looked at
the potential impact of demographic variables including gender, education level, skilled
versus non-skilled positions, time in position, and shift assignment on safety climate and
/or general leadership practices.
The research project received approval from the WKU Office of Research
Integrity prior to the commencement of the study. A copy of the instrument and
accompanying “Informed Consent for Study Participants” is included in the appendices
section. Detail regarding the validity and reliability of the survey instrument were
provided in Chapter III.
The survey questions aimed at measuring safety climate and general leadership
practices were structured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1= never through 7 =
always. Questions regarding length of service and number of injuries required
participants to insert an appropriate numerical response. Questions aimed at other
demographic elements including assigned work shift, gender, education level achieved,
and departmental assignment were developed using a multiple choice format.
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Population
Members of the university Department of Facilities Management were asked to
voluntarily complete the survey during regularly scheduled group meetings. The
participants represented four functional areas within the overall facilities organization:
Maintenance, Plant Operations, Building Services Attendants, and Grounds Crew. A total
of 252 employees completed the survey instrument. Based on a total population of 309
within the Department of Facilities Management, a study participation rate of 81% was
achieved. All submitted surveys were included in the analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
As shown in Table 1, the variable of assigned work shift was divided into two
categories, day shift and night shift. Day shift was defined as those employees beginning
work at or after 6:00 a.m., while night shift included all employees beginning their work
shifts after 3:00 p.m. Among the 252 respondents, 167 (66.2 %) indicated a day shift
work assignment, 79 (31.4 %) indicated night shift, and six ( 2.4 %) provided no response
to the question.
Details regarding the gender of participates are included in Table 2. Among the
252 total participants, 135 (53.5 %) were male, while females accounted for 104 (41.2%).
Thirteen participants (5.3 %) did not indicate a gender classification on their surveys.
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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics of Respondents
Assigned Work Shift
___________________________________________
Work Shift

N

Percent

___________________________________________
Day

167

66.2

Night

79

31.4

6

2.4

No Response

Total
252
100.0
__________________________________________
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents- Gender
___________________________________________
Gender
N
Percent
___________________________________________
Male

135

53.5

Female

104

41.2

13

5.3

No Response

Total
252
100.0
___________________________________________
The education level of the respondents is included in Table 3. Among the 252
employees completing the survey, 102 (40.4%) indicated they had graduated from high
school or completed a General Education Development (GED) Examination. One
hundred four of the employees (41.2%) reported completing some college or technical

43

school, while 34 (13.5%) indicated they were college graduates. Thirteen individuals did
not provide a response to the question.
Table 4 provides information regarding the distribution of respondents by workgroup within the university’s Department of Facilities Management. Fifty-one employees
(20.2%) indicated they were assigned to the Maintenance Group. Plant Operations Group
accounted for 25 employees (9.9%) while 144 (57.1%) of the participants indicated
assignments in Building Services. Twenty-nine employees reported being members of the
Grounds Crew, and three respondents failed to provide a response to the question.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents
Level of Education Completed
_____________________________________________
Education Level
N
Percent
_____________________________________________
HS or GED

102

40.4

Some College or Tech

104

41.2

College Graduate

34

13.5

No Response

12

4.9

Total
252
100.0
____________________________________________
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents
Assigned Work Groups
_________________________________________________
Work Group
N
Percent
_________________________________________________
Maintenance

51

20.2

Plant Operations

25

9.9

144

57.1

29

11.5

3

1.3

Building Services
Grounds
No Response

Total
252
100.0
_________________________________________________

The final demographic question included in the survey results related to the
employee’s length of service to the university, as shown in Table 5. Seventy-seven
individuals indicated a length of service between zero and two years, accounting for
30.5% of the total responses. Employees having served the university from three to seven
years accounted for 81 persons (32.1%) while 93 individuals (36.9%) indicated an overall
length of service of eight or more years. Only one participant failed to provide data for
the question.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Respondents
Length of Career at University
_______________________________________________
Years
N
Percent
_______________________________________________
1-2

77

30.5

3-7

81

32.1

8- Above

93

36.9

1

00.5

No Response

Total
252
100.0
______________________________________________
Analysis
This research study sought to answer three primary questions:
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual
injury/illness rates within an organization?
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices of
supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?
The analysis of the data will be provided aligned with the individual research
questions.
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Analysis Research Question One
The first question of this study asked, “Does a significant correlation exist
between employee perceptions of supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of
workers and actual injury/illness rates within an organization?”
Initial statistical analysis indicated strong consistency, based on a lack of variance
in mean scores between groups, relative to their responses to the safety climate questions.
The results also indicated a strong positive mean score for all respondents of 5.21 for the
same safety climate questions. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 6.
A Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient was computed to assess
the relationship between the Safety Climate Score and the number of occupational
injuries, based on three injury severity classifications, within each workgroup. No
significant correlations were found, with the exception of one data point for the Plant
Operations Group, injuries requiring medical attention, which resulted in a weak, yet
significant correlation based on p < .05 (r = 0.43, n = 25, p = 0.03). Results for all groups
are displayed in Table 7.
Based on the findings as presented, the null hypotheses relative to Research
Question One is not rejected. The survey data does not indicate a substantial correlation
between the safety climate and injury experience within these workgroups.
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Table 6
Safety Climate Score and Employee Injuries by Workgroup
______________________________________________________________________________________

Workgroup

Safety Climate
Score

Minor Injuries

Injuries Requiring Injuries with
Medical Treatment Lost Work Days

______________

_______________

_________________

N

𝑋

SD

𝑋

N

SD

N

𝑋

SD

____________

N

𝑋

SD

______________________________________________________________________________________

Maintenance

51 5.39 0.94

48 0.41 1.56

48 0.06 0.24

48 0.06 0.24

Plant
Operations

25 5.37 1.09

25 0.20 0.50

25 0.04 0.20

25 0.00 0.00

Building
Services

144 5.19 1.33

136 0.27 0.68

136 0.09 0.35

136 0.09 0.34

Grounds

29 5.00 1.28

29 0.68 2.03

29 0.13 0.35

29 0.06 0.25

3

14

14

14

252

238

238

238

No Response
Total

______________________________________________________________________________________

Table 7
Correlation Between Safety Climate Score and Employee Injuries by Work Group
______________________________________________________________________________________

Minor Injuries
____________
Workgroup

N

r

Injuries Requiring
Medical Treatment
r

Injuries with
Lost Work Days
r

______________________________________________________________________________________

Maintenance

48

0.23

0.19

0.19

Plant Operations

25

0.19

0.43 *

0.00

Building Services

136

0.01

0.00

0.00

Grounds

29

0.00

0.12

0.16

No Response

14

Total

252

______________________________________________________________________________________

*Significant p <.05
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In addition to the survey data collected specifically for this study, relevant data
exists for the university as a whole regarding both injuries requiring medical treatment
(Total Recordable Cases) and injuries resulting in days away from work (Lost Workday
Cases). The collection of this data is a legal requirement under the provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act. The methods for collecting and reporting the data
are established by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A comparison of annual rates of significant injuries between the university being
studied and rates for universities as reported by the Bureau of labor Statistics was
performed. The rates for the university were calculated using a formula adopted by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for normalizing injury rate reporting:
Number of injuries and illnesses X 200,000 / Employee hours worked = Incidence rate
The 200,000 hours in the formula represents the equivalent of 100 employees working 40
hours per week, 50 weeks per year, and provides a standard approach for the incidence
rates (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012).
The injury rates for the university being studied were for calendar year 2012. The
employees at the university reported a total of 47 occupational injuries that met the
criteria for inclusion on the U.S. Department of Labor Summary of Work-Related
Injuries and Illnesses, also referred to as Recordable Cases. Included in the 47 total cases
were 13 that resulted in employees missing at least one day of work, otherwise referred to
as Lost Workday Cases (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012).
Utilizing the prescribed formula, the 2012 annual recordable case rate for the
university being studied was calculated at 1.7 cases per 100,000 hours worked:
47 cases x200,000 = 9,400,000 /5,434,010 hours worked=1.72 Total Recordable Rate.
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Using the same formula, the lost workday case rate was calculated:
13 cases x 200,000 = 2,600,000 / 5,434,010 hours worked = 0.47 Lost Workday Rate
The comparative numbers originated from the Bureau of Labor Statistics report,
Incident Rates of Non-Fatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry and Case
Types- 2011. The 2011 calendar year data is the most current comparative data available
at the time of this study. The BLS reported corresponding injury rate data for the
education and health services sectors in general at 4.7 total recordable cases per 100,000
hours worked, and 1.3 lost workday cases per 100,000 hours worked. The BLS further
reported rates specifically for colleges, universities, and professional schools at 2.1 total
recordable case rate and .6 lost workday case rate.
The findings displayed in Table 8 provide evidence that supports the concept
outlined in Research Question One. The annual total recordable injury rates for the
university studied were 19% lower than the national average for a similar period of time.
The lost workday case rate for the same periods of comparison were 21.6 % lower. The
safety climate score for the representative sample of employees collected during the study
is 5.27. Based on the 7-point Likert scale used in the study, the median score for safety
climate is 3.50. Therefore, the safety climate for the university studied should be viewed
as substantially positive.
The individual group data collected as part of the survey process did not yield any
substantial correlations between the group safety climate scores and their injury
experience. However, applying the university-wide normalized data to a validated
national database focused on colleges and universities yielded findings supportive of the
concept that a positive safety climate will yield fewer injuries among the employees.
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Table 8
Subject University Injury Rates Compared with Bureau of Labor Statistics Injury Data
For U.S. Universities
Subject University *
Total Recordable Case Rate

1.7

BLS Data **
2.1

Differential
19.0 %

Lost Workday Case Rate
0.47
0.60
21.6 %
________________________________________________________________________
*Subject University Data for Calendar Year 2012
** Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Injury Data for Calendar Year 2011

Analysis Research Question Two
The second research question asked, “Does a significant correlation exist between
specific leadership practices of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived
by their employees?”
Initial statistical analysis indicated strong consistency between groups based on
the lack of variance in mean scores by group relative to their responses to the leadership
practice questions. The results also indicated a strong positive mean score for all
respondents of 5.62 for the same leadership questions. The results of the analysis are
displayed in Table 9.
A Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient was computed to assess
the relationship between the Safety Climate Score and the results of Leadership Practices
Questions, by workgroup. The results ranged from 0.81 for the Grounds Group to 0.85
for the Plant Operations Group, indicating a strong positive correlation. The results for all
groups are included in Table 10.
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Table 9
Leadership Practice Scores by Workgroup
____________________________________________________________
Department
N
𝑋
SD
____________________________________________________________
Maintenance

51

5.74

0.92

Plant Operations

25

5.84

1.04

144

5.56

1.32

29

5.62

0.98

Building Services
Grounds
No Response

3

Total

252

____________________________________________________________
Table 10
Safety Climate Scores Compared with Leadership Practice Scores by Workgroup
______________________________________________________________________________________

Safety Climate
Work Group

N

𝑋

SD

Leadership Practices
N

𝑋

SD

Correlation

______________________________________________________________________________________

Maintenance

51

5.29

0.94

51

5.74

0.92

0.84*

Plant Operations

25

5.37

1.09

25

5.84

1.04

0.85*

144

5.19

1.33

144

5.56

1.32

0.84*

29

5.00

1.28

29

5.62

0.98

0.81*

Building Services
Grounds
No Response
Total

3

3

252

252

______________________________________________________________________________________

*Significant p <.05
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Based on the findings of as presented, the null hypotheses relative to Research
Question Two is rejected. The survey data indicates a strong correlation between the
Safety Climate Scores and the results of the Leadership Practices questions across all four
groups.
Analysis Research Question Three
The third research question asked, “Is there a significant difference in employee
views on safety climate and leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee
demographic variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?”
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to compare each of the
demographic variables of gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled positions,
time in position, and shift assignment with both the safety climate and leadership
practices scores.
Relative to gender, males accounted for 135 (54%) of the participants while 104
(41%) reported as female. Thirteen participants or (5%) failed to indicate gender on their
surveys. The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance between the two
genders when compared to either the safety climate or leadership practice scores. The
results did not indicate any instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the
null hypothesis for the gender element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected.
The data related to the gender variable is displayed in Table 11.
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Table 11
Safety Climate and Leadership Practice Scores by Gender
____________________________________________________________
Safety Climate

Leadership Practices

Gender
N
𝑋
SD
N
𝑋
SD
____________________________________________________________
Male

135

5.27

1.10

135

5.66

1.10

Female

104

5.04

1.32

104

5.48

1.28

No Response

13

13

Total
252
252
____________________________________________________________
Data concerning the level of education of participants indicated that 102 (40%) of
the participants reported being high school graduates or having successfully completed
the General Education Development Test (GED), 104 (41%) reported having completed
some amount of college or technical school training, 34 (13%) reported being college
graduates, and 12 failed to indicate a level of education completed on their surveys.
The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of
participants in each of the levels of education. The results did not indicate any instances
at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis for the education level
element of research question three cannot be rejected. The data related to the education
level variable is displayed in Table 12.
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Table 12
Safety Climate and Leadership Practices Scores by Level of Education
__________________________________________________________________
Safety Climate

Leadership Practices

Education Level
N
𝑋
SD
N
𝑋
SD
__________________________________________________________________
HS or GED

102

5.42

1.10

102

5.72

1.16

Some College or Tech

104

5.16

1.18

104

5.59

1.20

College Graduate

34

4.91

1.44

34

5.54

1.26

No Response

12

12

Total
252
252
__________________________________________________________________
To analyze the potential impacts of the positions held by participants on their
view of their supervisors’ performance, data were assembled based on the workgroup
assignments. Participants within the Maintenance and Plant Operations groups were
classified as having skilled positions; these individuals have technical training and/or
professional certifications in a recognized craft or trade such as electricians or Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning Technicians (HVAC). The participants in the Building
Services and Grounds groups were considered to have non-skilled positions. The normal
assignments for these groups include general cleaning, lawn care, etc. Participants
occupying skilled positions accounted for 76 (30%) of the respondents, while 173 (69%)
were aligned to non-skilled. Three participants (1%) failed to indicate a workgroup
assignment.
The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of
participants between those assigned to skilled or non-skilled positions. The results did not
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indicate any instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis
for position skill level element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. The data
related to the position skill level variable is displayed in Table 13.
Table 13
Safety Climate and Leadership Practice Scores
by Workers in Skilled vs. Non-Skilled Positions
____________________________________________________
Department
N
𝑋
SD
____________________________________________________
Maintenance *

51

5.29

0.94

Plant Operations *

25

5.37

1.09

144

5.19

1.33

29

5.00

1.28

Building Services **
Grounds **
No Response

3

Total
252
____________________________________________________
* Skilled Positions
** Non-Skilled Positions
Data related to the years of service of participants at the university indicated that
77 (30%) of the participants reported a length of service between zero and two years, 81
(32%) reported having between three and seven years, and 93 (37%) reported having
eight or more years of service. Only one participant failed to respond to the length of
service question.
The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of
participants based upon their length of service to the university. The results did not
indicate any instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis
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for length of service element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. The data
related to the length of service variable is displayed in Table 14.

Table 14
Safety Climate and Leadership Practices Scores by Years of Service
_____________________________________________________________________________

Safety Climate
Years of Service

N

𝑋

SD

Leadership Practices
N

𝑋

SD

__________________________________________________________________________

1-2

77

5.62

1.20

77

5.27

1.15

3-7

81

5.53

1.09

81

5.15

1.19

8- Above

93

5.71

1.26

93

5.22

1.32

No Response
Total

1

1

252

252

______________________________________________________________________________

Data were collected to assess the influence of assigned work shift on employees’
views of their supervisor related to safety climate and leadership practices. Responses
from participants indicated that 167 (67%) reported a day shift assignment, while 79
(31%) reported assignments on night shift. Two participants failed to respond to the shift
assignment question.
The results of the ANOVA indicated no significant variance in the responses of
participants based upon their assigned work shift. The results did not indicate any
instances at the p < .05 level. Based upon the findings, the null hypothesis for the shift
assignment element of Research Question Three cannot be rejected. The data related to
the shift assignment variable is displayed in Table 15.
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Table 15
Safety Climate and Leadership Practice Scores by Assigned Work Shift
_____________________________________________________________
Safety Climate

Leadership Practices

Shift
N
𝑋
SD
N
𝑋
SD
_____________________________________________________________
Day

167

5.29

1.15

167

5.72

1.12

Night

79

5.05

1.27

79

5.43

1.19

No Response

6

6

Total
252
252
______________________________________________________________
Summary
A comprehensive review of literature regarding the potential impact of leaders on
the safety of their subordinates yielded a variety of research spanning well over 30 years.
Beginning with Zohar (1980), the concept of safety climate emerged and has served as a
focal point of a number of key studies. The studies to date have focused on general
manufacturing, oil exploration, and heavy industry settings. The need to understand the
potential for transferability of findings to non-manufacturing settings, such as a
university, served as the primary driver for this research.
The study focused on maintenance and housekeeping personnel at a regional
comprehensive university during the summer of 2013. A potential participant pool of 300
employees was identified, and ultimately 252 (84%) completed surveys for the study.
A combination of analysis tools, including Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation
Coefficient and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), was used to assess the data surrounding
the proposed research questions. The results were presented in this chapter. Chapter V
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will provide additional perspective regarding the findings, along with potential
applications and possibilities for future research.
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CHAPTER V : DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
Occupational injuries have dramatic impacts, both direct and indirect, on not only
the worker that sustains the injury, but also the worker’s family, co-workers, supervisors,
and many others dependent upon the particular circumstances of the causal event. With
the creation of the National Safety Council and other organizations focused on the study
of injuries and method of injury prevention, countless studies have yielded a litany of
theories regarding the causes of these injuries and methods to protect human beings from
them.
Debates have continued throughout the history of the industrialized world
regarding who holds the responsibility for the safety of a worker. Early practice focused
squarely and solely on the injured worker and/or a co-worker who may have contributed
to the event. With the growth of trade unions and collective bargaining, followed by the
passage of the OSHA Act, employers became the primary holder of responsibility for the
safety of their workers. Requirements to identify and control common risks, provide
personal protective equipment, and train employees regarding the potential hazards they
face in performing their assigned tasks have resulted in a higher level of overall worker
safety in all sectors.
Despite the overall improvements in knowledge, processes, technology, and
training, workers still suffer injuries, including over 4600 fatal injuries in the U.S. in
2011 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012). The review of literature discussed several of the
current initiatives aimed at positively influencing behaviors by engaging workers and
supervisors more actively in injury prevention. All of the behavior related concepts
appear to have one common theme, the need for strong “safety focused” leadership. The
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most successful corporate-wide safety transformations studied, including Alcoa, DuPont,
and General Motors, all began with a strong focus on developing safety savvy leaders at
all levels.
The concept of measuring safety climate, first reported by Zohar (1980) is based
on worker responses to a series of questions aimed at gauging how workers feel their
supervisor responds to certain situations that potentially impact their safety. In the years
since, the original safety climate survey process received refinements based upon
statistical evaluations made following studies in a variety of settings across the globe.
The primary focus of this study centered on determining whether the safety
climate score of a workgroup correlates to the number of injuries and illnesses sustained
by the employees within the workgroup. A number of previous studies have established
relationships between the stated variables to varying degrees, and across a variety of
settings including oil and gas exploration, construction, and general manufacturing. The
construct of the study follows the basic path of the previous endeavors; however the
application in a university setting appears seminal.
This research strived to add to the body of knowledge regarding organizational
leadership influence on employee safety. In order to develop effective interventional
strategies for injury reduction, a greater understanding of the dynamics between
employees and supervisors relative to matters of safety is essential. This research aids in
understanding the potential impact of demographic variables such as gender, education
level, skilled versus non-skilled positions, time in position, and shift assignment on
employee views regarding safety climate within their workgroup.
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Three primary research questions form the foundation of this study:
1. Does a significant correlation exist between employee perceptions of
supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers and actual
injury/illness rates within an organization?
2. Does a significant correlation exist between specific leadership practices of
supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived by their employees?
3. Is there a significant difference in employee views on safety climate and
leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee demographic
variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?
Discussion of Research Findings
Findings for the specific research questions along with additional findings and
observations related to the study are included in this section.
Research Question One
Research Question One asked, “Does a significant correlation exist between
employee perceptions of his supervisor’s commitment to the health and safety of workers
and actual injury/illness rates within an organization?” A Pearson Product-Moment
Correlation Coefficient was conducted to assess the statistical relationship between the
safety climate score of participants drawn from survey Questions 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18,
20, 22, and 24 and the number of injuries that participants suffered within the last 12month period.
With the exception of one workgroup, Plant Operations, no significant
correlations emerged relative to research question one. In addition, the correlation found
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in the Plant Operations Group data while meeting the threshold for significance (p < .05)
appeared weak with a level of (p = 0.03). The overall lack of statistical significance may
be a function of sample size as divided within the four workgroups. A larger sample size
may be required to yield a statistically significant finding.
While the null hypothesis for Research Question One was rejected based upon the
survey data, a comparison of secondary data gathered across the subject university as a
whole, with national injury data (U.S. Department of Labor, 2012), revealed a positive
relationship between a positive safety climate score for all respondents of 5.21 based on a
7- point Likert scale. The university data for all employees for the calendar year 2012
indicated a Total OSHA Recordable Case Rate of 1.7 cases per 100,000 hours worked
compared to a national average for universities of 2.1 reflected in the most recent data
available by the Bureau of Labor Statistics Data for calendar year 2011. The comparison
revealed that the subject university rate was 19.0% lower than the national average. The
data indicated a similar story for Lost Workday Case Rates, with the subject university
displaying an annual rate of 0.47 cases per 100,000 hours worked versus a national
average of 0.60, a 21.6% lower rate of injuries.
The individual group data collected as part of the survey process did not yield any
substantial correlations between the group safety climate scores and their injury
experience. However, applying the university-wide normalized data to a validated
national database focused on colleges and universities yielded findings supportive of the
concept that a positive safety climate will yield fewer injuries among the employees.
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Research Question Two
Research Question Two asked, “Does a significant correlation exist between
specific leadership practices of supervisors and their safety climate ratings as perceived
by their employees?” Initial statistical analysis indicated strong consistency between
groups based on the lack of variance in mean scores by group relative to their responses
to the leadership practice questions. The results also indicated a strong positive mean
score for all respondents of 5.62 for the same leadership questions. A Pearson ProductMoment Correlation Coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the
Safety Climate Score and the results of Leadership Practices Questions by workgroup.
The results ranged from 0.81 for the Grounds Group to 0.85 for the Plant Operations
Group, indicating a strong positive correlation.
The purpose in including this question was to validate the premise that leader
actions transcend the operational climate of the workgroup. The findings indicate that,
among the groups included in this study, the leaders displayed a consistency of actions
both in areas of general leadership practices and more specifically actions that potentially
impacted the safety of their subordinates.
Research Question Three
Research Question Three asked, “Is there a significant difference in employee
views on safety climate and leadership practices of their supervisor based on employee
demographic variables including gender, education level, skilled versus non-skilled
positions, time in position, or shift assignment?” An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed to compare each of the demographic variables. The findings across the five
demographic variables failed to yield any instances where the value of p < .05, therefore
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no significant differences existed relative to gender, education level, skilled versus nonskilled positions, time in position, or shift assignment.
This lack of variance between demographic groups should serve as a positive indicator of
a consistency of leadership among the supervisors of the participants within this research.
Additional Findings
While not specifically germane to the prescribed research questions, an interesting
variance emerged regarding responses to two of the safety climate questions. The median
rating for all survey questions by all respondents was 5.40 on a 7- point Likert scale. The
two questions referenced numbers 14 and 27 were the only questions with ratings below
5.0. Question 14 -- “Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule”
had a median rating of 4.33 while question 27 -- “Frequently talks about safety issues
throughout the work week” -- had a median score of 4.87. The ultimate meaning of the
rating divergence specifically regarding these questions lies beyond the realm of this
study. The presence of this anomaly within the data may provide a window for a more
focused future inquiry.
Study Limitations
The study addressed a relatively small sample of employees from one functional
staff department at a single regional comprehensive university. The findings may have
limits due to a potential lack of geographic, cultural, and ethnic diversity that may exist
within the organization sampled. Additional studies should be considered to provide a
broader view of the subject in other similar settings.
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Suggestions for Future Research
The pursuit of knowledge that may prevent someone from suffering an
occupational injury is a valuable endeavor. Developing a deeper understanding of the
dynamics of leadership, as it relates to fostering a positive safety climate at the
workgroup level, may ultimately lead to opportunities for enhancements in leadership
selection and development processes. Additional studies could be conducted among
similar populations at other universities, healthcare facilities, and non-profit
organizations that would continue to build on the overall body of safety climate research.
Additional inquiry may be warranted within the target population of this study to
explore the divergent data related to survey questions 14 and 27. A more granular
exploration into the subtopics included in these questions may lead to development of
strategies for improvement of local leadership practices.
Leading safety in the workplace is a pivotal topic that warrants additional inquiry.
There exist several levels of focus on the topic beyond the first-line supervisor; these
include actions of mid-level and senior leaders, in addition to enablers and catalysts
including education and training for leaders at all levels. Establishing “need to know”
attitudes towards safety related topics within organizations must start at the top. The
organizational importance of specific initiatives and practices begins with the tone and
direction set by leaders. Instilling a sense of importance regarding the safety of workers,
into the psyche of leaders remains a dilemma. Exploring the current state of leadership
development may provide valuable insight on where to begin.
Dunlap (2009) discussed the lack of safety content in leader education,
specifically in Masters of Business Administration (MBA) programs. A review of MBA
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curriculums, coupled with interviews of MBA candidates, provided evidence that formal
course content focused on safety leadership is non-existent. During interviews with
leaders in business settings that had recently completed an MBA, Dunlap found that
while all participants viewed safety as important, and a key responsibility for them as
leaders, none indicated that they had received formal training on the subject area.
Behm, Veltri, Fonooni, and Haynes (2008) surveyed the Deans of 50 business
school across the United States to determine if their programs included environmental
health and safety (EH&S) content as either required or elective courses. They further
asked the deans to provide personal insight into their perspectives regarding the
importance of EH&S knowledge for business leaders. With regard to curriculum, no
health and safety related courses were included as either required or elective in any of the
programs, while five schools listed elective courses in environmental related topics.
The study by Behm et al. (2008) also solicited feedback from the business school
deans regarding their personal views on the importance of EH&S to today’s business
leaders. Of the deans that provided comments:
Most thought that safety was an operational issue while environmental
management was more strategic, and thus more important for their students
to understand. Respondents also referred to the importance of green issues
and sustainability, and the fact that environmental issues are public whereas
safety is an internal issue, suggesting that public issues are more important
than internal issues to the workforce.
Based upon the findings of Dunlap (2009) and Behm et al. (2008), there appears
to be a need for inclusion of EH&S related topics, focused on key leadership practices, in
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established avenues of leader development such as general management degree and/or
MBA programs. Establishing a strong case for the inclusion of core safety courses within
the curriculum of existing business degree programs may provide a platform for changing
the paradigm of leaders with regard to their role in protecting workers.
Additional research should be considered to assist in strengthening the case for
inclusion of EH&S within business curriculums. A comparative survey that solicited the
view of individual leaders relative to their focus and involvement in leading safety
initiatives within their organizations may provide a valuable base on which to build a
compelling case for change. Establishing a correlation between the active support of
safety initiatives among leaders, and reduced injury rates within their organizations
would provide an opportunity to assign an estimated dollar savings associated with the
positive leadership practices. While some may view the attribution of monetary
implications to the topic of employee injuries as abhorrent, the exercise may provide a
common rally point for the divergent philosophies that span the world of business
academics.
Enlisting key faculty from leading business schools to jointly participate in safety
leadership research may also hold promise for escalating interest in the topic area. The
potential leverage that accompanies the endorsement of theories and practices by
established academics’ within renowned universities can greatly accelerate the
recognition and acceptance of concepts such as active safety leadership across the world
of business.
Establishing practical correlations between the implementation of positive safety
initiatives with established business practices such as quality, waste reduction, and
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sustainability may provide yet another avenue. Taubitz (2010) discussed avenues that
safety professionals can and should utilize to become “part of the discussion” around lean
and sustainable initiatives. Taubitz illustrates that “natural” partnership opportunities
exist to inject EH&S principles into the “fabric” of sustainable initiatives.
La Duke (2011) makes a case for the application of Deming’s principles of
elimination of waste and adoption of new operating philosophies around safety within
organizations. Injuries and the resulting direct and indirect effects on daily activities
within an organization constitute waste. Preventing injuries constitutes a proactive form
of waste elimination, a practice core to Deming’s principles. The principle of adopting
new operating philosophies supports the premises espoused by La Duke (2011) and
Taubitz (2010). Leaders must be motivated to think not only “outside the box” but also in
terms of actively championing EH&S practices in their daily operational practices.
Establishing partnerships between business leaders, academia, and safety
professionals to collectively undertake a series of research initiatives aimed at
establishing a substantive body of data to support the need for leadership engagement in
safety, appears to hold the most promise for gaining acceptance of safety leadership
concepts.
Conclusions
The documented research into the specific topic of safety climate appears to have
begun with a seminal study by Zohar (1980) that sought to link the potential impact of
organizational leaders actions on the overall view and actions of their employees toward
safety. While the initial study did not yield findings that supported a significant
correlation between supervisor’s actions and the relative safety of employees, it provided
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clear indicators that the concept of safety climate was both real and warranted further
study.
Following Zohar’s initial research in 1980 through 2003, some 29 studies were
undertaken around the globe focused on exploring the concept of safety culture and/or
climate in a broad array of industrial settings. While the structure and findings of the
studies presented considerable variability, commonality was found in on the fact that
leaders’ actions provided the greatest impact either positive or negative on the overall
operational climate of the workgroups and, specifically, on the area of safety (Yule,
2003).
The findings of this study, while in several instances not yielding statistically
significant data, support several key assertions that appear to have relevancy in the study
and practice of the critical importance of leadership in providing a safe workplace. The
overall responses of the study participants in both safety climate and general leadership
actions indicated strong consistency, and also substantially positive overall scores. These
positive survey scores coupled with the subject university data that indicates an injury
experience some 20 % less than the average for U.S. universities, provides a persuasive
argument for the overall construct of the study.
It stands to reason that the immediate supervisor would have the greatest
influence on their employees due to the high level of daily contact and the basic nature of
the leader-employee relationship. Flin (2003) supported the notion that while all levels of
leadership within an organization have influence on policies and actions that, directly
impact the safety of employees, generally speaking the lower level employees face the
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greatest risk for injury. Therefore, their immediate supervisors have the greatest potential
for influence within their span of control.
Going forward, much additional research is needed on this subject of safety
climate. A compelling case exists based upon the number of occupational fatalities and
serious injuries that occur each day in this country. The opportunities to better understand
the relationship and dynamics that exist between supervisors and the employees they
manage, particularly in the area of safety climate, appear abundant. While complex, the
concepts of organizational culture and climate become a bit clearer with each additional
piece of research completed.
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